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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Fiscal policy, being an embodiment of government measures to raise 
resources through taxes, tariffs of utilities, user charges and pricing of public sector 
goods, diverts resources from private sector to the government which rechannels 
these resource into socially preferred activities. The resource diversion and their 
rechannelisation helps achieve certain economic goals, and for this reason, the fiscal 
policy has strong interactive linkages with other macro economic policies. By virtue 
of this strong bond, the fiscal indicators have a close interactive association with 
other macro  economic indicators. For this reason, the role of fiscal policy is 
inevitably vulnerable to influences of other economic policies and fiscal discipline 
and general economic health of the country become interlinked. This linkage results 
in generating trade offs between different macroeconomic policy goals. 
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate how interaction of macro economic 
policies in Pakistan has moved over the years in past and to assess the ultimate 
impact on fiscal adjustment of economic policies initiated under  the structural 
adjustment and stabilisation (SAAS)  reforms.  This presentation centres around the 
basic hypothesis that the fiscal stability chiefly depends on  interaction between 
public finances and other macro indicators  of the economy which are differently 
influenced by different policies. The objective is to demonstrate how conflicting 
goals made the task of the policy mix under SAAS reforms difficult in  reducing the 
fiscal gap. 
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The presentation in the paper has been ordered in four parts. The first part 
describes macro economic scenario, albeit briefly, prevailing at the turn of the 1980s, 
a time period when a departure from the old development strategy was conceived 
and a new agenda of structural reforms was put in place. This provides a background 
for the second part which presents a short account of the reforms launched since the 
close of the 80s. The third part provides an analysis of how the implementation of 
different policy reforms in different sectors has impacted on  the public finances. The 
disaggregated analysis of the fiscal and non fiscal factors initiated by the reform 
programme of the government to put the economy back on a track of fiscal 
adjustment is also provided in this part. The concluding section explores alternative 
possibilities for forging improvements in the existing national development strategy 
so that it succeeds in achieving fiscal discipline while pursuing other goals. 
 
II.  MACRO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN 1980s 
During the first four decades since independence, different development 
strategies were pursued.  By the end of that period, the performance of the economy 
in terms of growth, equity and stability is a mixed one.  On the bright side, there was 
high and sustained  economic growth of around 6 percent per annum. There was also 
marked diversification in the production edifice as the manufacturing sector grew 
from a negligible base to a substantial base. The tertiary sectors also grew in 
importance. The external sector considerably expanded. It had generated an 
appreciable growth in exportable surplus. To meet the country’s growing 
requirements of capital and raw material, imports were financed by continued aid 
inflow and Pakistan’s hard earned foreign exchange. These developments were 
accompanied by moderate expansion in social services and physical infrastructure 
like energy, electricity, telecommunications  and roads. The dismal side of the story 
is that the economy remained persistently in fiscal and BoP deficits.  These deficits 
primarily reflected the national resource gap: national savings hovered around 15 
percent of GDP while investment was maintained at over 20 percent of GDP.  
Pursuing goal of high GDP growth could have pushed  macro-economic stability into 
a  jeopardy.  Fiscal indiscipline had persisted, taxation had disappointedly  settled at 
a  low level of 14 percent of GDP while budgetary expenditure had continued to rise. 
Government’s borrowing had reached an alarming level. Subsidies and debt 
servicing had pre-empted resources from the routine functions of the Government; 
the whole development budget was being financed for a long time through 
borrowing. Since the early 80s the government’s non-inflationary resources fell short 
of current expenditure and as a result the deficit in the current budget was also met 
through borrowings. 
Exports had for years in a row fell short of imports; and the current account of 
BoP had  stubbornly remained  in the red. The country’s dependence on foreign 
borrowings had increased and even most of the borrowings were consumed for debt 
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servicing, causing ultimately a steep fall in foreign aid inflow.  Heavy recourse was 
made to borrowing from the banking system for meeting the budgetary requirement; 
this crowded out the private sector and in fact the monetary policy has rightly been 
criticised as having been made a hostage to the fiscal policy. Bank credit was rationed 
through annual credit plan, and it was over regulated. Interest rate for many activities 
was zero and in many cases negative in real terms. Social sectors considerably lagged 
behind the real sectors and the country has been ranked very low among other 
developing countries of the region when judged by social indicators like literacy rate, 
infant mortality, access to potable water, sanitation and housing facilities. Some 
sections of the society did not adequately benefit from the past growth. Research 
studies indicate some improvement in poverty incidence from 1979 to 1988 but the 
incidence of poverty has gone up in the 1990s. There was a large number of people 
living below poverty line. The growth had also engendered many disparities among the 
people in their access to education and social amenities. The disparities hit hard the 
rural masses, women and children. Unemployment has remained persistently a 
structural problem. The open unemployment, estimated by using broad definition of 
employment as taking a person employed who worked for one hour or longer in a 
week, was estimated at 5-6 percent and yet when adjusted for underemployment it 
could be no less than one fifth of the total  labour  force. Its incidence was high among 
the educated youth and the women. Demand-supply gap in physical infrastructure had 
widened; road network, telecommunication facilities, electricity etc. were assessed  
inadequate to support the existing  6 percent per annum in future. 
The weaknesses and problems assessed in the late 80s could be capsuled as: 
(a) mismanagement of the economy displayed by persistent fiscal imbalance,  heavy 
reliance on borrowings, low savings rate, structural deficit in balance of payments, 
domination of public sector in the economy, excessive regulatory system and 
continued inflation; (b) low productivity of the real sectors and inefficient production 
edifice; (c) high population growth and neglect of social sectors reflected in 
indicators like low literacy rate, high unemployment,  skewed income distribution 
and high poverty incidence, inadequate health facilities, regional and gender 
disparities in sharing the benefits of growth; and (d) weak physical infrastructure, 
manifested into qualitative  and quantitative inadequacies in transport and 
communication network, and sluggish growth in energy resources.  
A diagnostic review of lopsided development over the first four decades helps 
in the identification of many a factors which the past policies have either failed to 
recognise or the policy-makers had consciously ignored them as these were 
considered to be incongruous to their vested interests. The other most probable 
reason, could also be that soft options, based on political grounds, were preferred 
over long term decisions, which initially appeared to be painful and politically tough, 
but would have ultimately steered the economy out of the difficulties and would have 
served the national interest. 
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III.  SYNOPSIS OF RECENT REFORMS 
The government has adopted a comprehensive agenda of structural adjustment 
and stabilisation  (SAAS) reforms to attend to structural problems and to put the 
economy back on the track of growth recovery with economic stability, a key 
element of which is the goal of improving  fiscal discipline,  mainly by reducing 
budgetary gap. [for details of reforms see Ahmad (1997), Economic Survey (1992-
93) and Qureshi (1995)]. To maintain a cohesion in discussion, the synopsis of 
reforms is presented under four groups by virtue of the ultimate goals these reforms 
are envisaged to achieve. First, on top of the agenda was (and is still) the goal of 
Macroeconomic Stability consisting of three ingredients of budgetary balance, BoP 
improvement and reduction in inflation. Fiscal and monetary policy reforms and 
devaluation have been mainly aimed to achieve this.  Second, the goal of promoting 
efficiency and fostering growth was intended to be achieved through deregulations 
and decontrols, privatisation, market liberalisation, institutional reforms and 
improvement in public sector efficiency. Third, the goal of Human Resource 
Development is to be attained through population control, improvement in social 
services, reduction in personal and regional disparities in access to social services 
and strengthening the social safety-nets.  Fourth, the goal of expansion in physical 
infrastructure and development of energy resources was to be achieved through 
improved pricing system and encouraging the private sector, especially the foreign 
investors. We have selected those policies which had directly or indirectly impacted 
on public finances although these have been primarily targeted at some other specific 
goals.   
 
IV.  IMPLEMENTATION OF SELECTED 
POLICY REFORMS 
 
Monetary Policy’s  Fallout for Public Finances 
Monetary Policy has been used as a supportive plank for the fiscal policy for a 
fairly  long time in Pakistan. The central bank which is its executing agency, as is the 
case elsewhere in the world, was kept until recently as an appendix to Ministry of 
Finance. The monetary policy was excessively regulated and was used to provide 
support to fiscal policies. Interest rates were arbitrarily fixed by the central bank 
under the direction of the Government. Distorted structure of interest rates  was 
pursued to  favour lending to government for financing budgetary gap and  meeting 
requirements of  certain priority sectors like small farmers, locally manufactured 
machinery and some specified exports. General lending to the private sector was 
made at a high interest rate. (See Annex Tables 1, 2 and 3). In fact there was a wide 
dispersion in interest rate starting from minimum zero to a maximum of 9-10 percent 
and over time the cap on the maximum rate has undergone changes. The general 
lending rate for a  considerably long time remained below the prevailing inflation 
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rate, implying that real interest rate was negative. The bank credit to the Government 
for financing budgetary requirements was advanced at a very low rate; even most of 
the credit was at around one percent and besides that, the Government had a direct 
access to the surplus deposits of some public sector agencies at a low rate, though 
higher than one percent, and yet certainly much less than the inflation rate. The 
average inflation rate in the country has been around 7 percent per annum in the first 
four decades. The low nominal interest rate adjusted for inflation assured negative 
real interest rate on government borrowing from the banking system and thus the 
government borrowing from the banking system was substantially subsidised.   
The central bank has been regulating bank credit through annual credit plans, 
implying direct control on total money supply as well as on its further  allocation to 
different sectors of the economy. Monetary policy management was more or less on 
the pattern of centrally planned economies. The credit plan first reserved the credit 
for the government and the residual in the total annual credit ceiling was allowed to 
the private sector. The Government requirements for credit were essentially to meet 
budgetary gap and to finance commodity operations: the interest on the latter was 
higher than that on the former but that too enjoyed a concessional  margin of 2-3 
percent point over the general interest rate. They carried high weight in the annual 
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Government Sector 3.06 17.50 9.20 71.37 78.94 359.76 57.63 653.49 
– Budgetary Financing 1.52 13.83 5.63 55.44 65.70 322.77 48.46 554.98 
– Commodity Operations 1.54 3.67 3.57 15.93   7.34  30.20 10.59 63.66 
Total Domestic Credit 5.07 33.07 29.52 146.03   89.82   595.39 149.11 1202.35 
 
Within the country, the government taps three types of borrowings i.e. 
permanent debt, floating debt and unfunded debt. Of these the floating debt is the 
one obtained from the banking system as mentioned above. The other two categories 
of debt have been raised from the open market, the chief source of which is general 
public, but occasionally public sector financial institutions were also allowed to 
purchase government bonds and securities. Since the direct government borrowings 
from the central bank i.e. floating debt was done at a low nominal interest rate and 
such loans had a large element of subsidy. The government made frequently heavy 
reliance on this type of borrowing for meeting the budgetary gap. Until the early 80s 
floating debt was less than half of the total government debt. Government reliance on 
this source of borrowing starting tapering off in subsequent period  in the 80s but its 
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share had declined to the lowest level in 1991-92. As the process of the 
implementation of reforms continued the Central bank started gradually shifting 
from this source of borrowing to the open market operations. The Treasury bills and 
Government securities issued to borrow from the banking institutions were 
progressively  auctioned in the market and the government has started offering a 
competitive interest rate in the open market. This interest rate has remained in the 
vicinity of 14-15 percent. These rates showed not only substantial increase over the 
nominal interest rates charged in the pre-reforms period but the real interest rates 
also turned out to be positive as the nominal rate exceeded inflation rate. Reforms 
had progressively exposed the government borrowing from the banking system to the 
open market forces. As a result the two developments of far reaching fiscal 
consequences have taken place. First, the government was, in a large measure, 
deprived of real subsidy on borrowing from the banking system and government had 
now to pay much higher nominal interest rate,  making on the other hand real interest 
rate positive. Second, raising resources through open market operations by the 
government, created a competition with the private sector and as a result the general 
level of interest rates in the country went up and this also pulled up the cost of 
borrowings in the form of permanent debt and unfunded debt. This situation caused a 
double pressure on debt liability and consequently the overall cost of government 
borrowing shot up and the debt servicing liability also increased. This has had a 
snow ball effect on the internal outstanding debt profile. The share of debt servicing 
in the current budget has substantially increased. The debt servicing coupled with 
defence alone eat up most of the government revenue. The government is now in a 
debt trap; it has to borrow not only to meet the primary fiscal deficit but also to 
service  its past loans. How the debt  trap has emerged over time could be gauged 
from the trends in the selected debt related indicators given in Table 2.  
 
Table 2 
Outstanding Domestic Debt 
(Rs Billion) 
Years Debt-related  
    Indicators 1980-81 1985-86 1992-93 1997-98 
Total Domestic Outstanding 58.09 203.12 615.31 1279.75 
Debt (% of GDP) (20.9) (39.5) (45.9) (42.1) 
– Floating Debt 31.69 57.63 215.82 549.71 
– Permanent Debt 13.76 58.23 245.49 265.69 
– Unfunded Debt Adjusted 12.64 57.63 154.00 464.35 
     for Debt Servicing 
Interest Payment on Floating 4.701 19.02 62.73 164.52 
   and Permanent Debt                
Note:  The figure has been extracted from a long series of data. 
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Repayment of principal in the case of all types of loans is adjusted against 
new loans each year but interest payment is adjusted only against unfunded loans. 
Thus debt servicing shown in the  budget  documents includes only interest payments 
for floating and permanent debts while it is repayment of principal and interest in the 
case of foreign loans. As the government has moved away from cheaper source of 
credit borrowing from the banking system, the growth of interest payments, on 
domestic debt has accelerated and outpaced the other components of debt  servicing. 
(See Table 3). 
 
Table 3 
Debt Servicing as % of GDP 
 1979-80 1985-86 1992-93 1997-98 
Interest Payment on Domestic Debt 1.1 2.5 4.7 5.6 
Interest Payment on Foreign Debt  1.0 1.2 1.3 1.0 
Repayment of Principal on Foreign Debt 2.4 2.1 2.2 3.2 
Total Debt Servicing 4.5 5.9 8.3 10.1 
 
Fiscal Implications of External Trade Policy Reforms 
Pakistan has a long history of excessively regulated foreign trade regime. The 
foreign trade has been considered a main source of revenues and the trade, 
particularly imports, was subject to high tariffs, which had simultaneously provided 
protection to the local industry. The tariff structure maintained wide dispersion of 
rates accompanied by enormous exemptions. Duty drawbacks and export rebates 
were allowed for promoting certain exports and some exports related industries. 
Besides tariffs, quantitative restrictions were also used to discourage some imports as 
well as exports: thereby checking imports was to shelter some local industries while  
restricting exports  was considered necessary to maintain adequate domestic 
availability of some commodities at low prices to the consumers. Pakistan has all 
along been dependent on foreign capital inflow to meet domestic resource gap, and 
this has provided leverage to donors to exert pressure in influencing the direction of 
the development strategy of the country. They have never been happy with regulated 
trade regime but in the 80s, donors, IMF and World Bank have largely succeeded in 
convincing  the authorities in Pakistan to negotiate an agenda of reforms for trade 
liberalisation. Since then the country has been steadily progressing in reducing the 
tariff and non tariff barriers. The agenda  of reduction in non tariff barriers has been 
speedily completed but the tariff reforms were interruptedly implemented. The 
punctuation in implementing the tariff reforms was necessitated purely on the ground 
of revenue loss, albeit there was wide spread agitation from local industry. 
Nevertheless the pace of trade reforms has been quite encouraging since 1988-89. 
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In March 1997, the largest step taken for reducing protection related to 
slashing the maximum tariff rate to 45 percent from 65 percent and minimising the 
multiple tariff rates to only 4  with cascadence on the basis of value addition, 
implying maximum rate on the import of the finished goods while minimum on the 
imports of raw material and machinery used in the high value added local industry 
but not locally manufactured. The ultimate  goal of the reforms is to bring maximum 
tariff rate to 35 percent as agreed by way of conditionalities with IMF (which 
coordinates on this with World Bank, ADB and Pakistan Economic Forum, a 
successor of Aid to Pakistan Consortium) and also as a requirement of WTO Charter 
already signed by Pakistan. The existing situation characterised by only 45 percent 
maximum tariff with four tariff rates, completely eliminated  all non tariff barriers, 
only a few items on the negative/restricted lists (and that too on very genuine 
grounds of security, religion etc.) demonstrates great efforts on the part of the 
government to move the economy towards liberalisation as especially contrasted 
with the situation prevailing ten years ago, when in 1987-88 there existed a huge 
negative and restricted list of items, maximum tariff rate was as high as 225 percent, 
coupled with 5 percent import surcharge, 5 percent Iqra surcharge and 4 percent 
licence fee, super imposed with an institutional cap in the form of Office of the Chief 
Controller, Imports and Exports to issue licences. Sequenced removal of restrictions 
on foreign trade over time could be seen in Annex Table 4. In the process of 
liberalisation , there has also  been marked progress in removing certain exemptions 
and improving the system of duty draw backs. 
The ultimate aim of liberalisation was not only to improve efficiency of the 
local industries by exposing them to international competition (in fact  this stipulated 
gradual elimination of inefficient industries which have grown under high protection 
and promoting efficient industries which could expectedly cope with the changing 
global system) and it was also meant to integrate the economy into global economy. 
By  removing  distortions  the authorities contemplated that the economy can grow 
on its intrinsic strength and find its place in the global economy on the basis of 
comparative advantages in trade and production. 
During the last ten years while there was good progress on the front of 
implementation of reforms the balance of trade had remained under continued 
pressure. The reforms have exerted both direct and indirect adverse effects on the 
public finances of the country. At the start of the reforms the custom duties stood the 
largest source of government revenues and that claimed 40.7 percent of total tax 
revenues in 1987-88 and their share has declined to 21.7 percent in 1997-98. Now 
only imports fetch revenues while the  exports which also used to fetch handsome 
revenues earlier to the government are now totally exempted from tariffs. The 
effective import duty has declined from 33.8 percent to 18.0 percent over this period. 
The indirect effect of trade reforms is that some local industries which were running 
under protection have heavily suffered and some of them have come to a standstill 
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and the  recessionary growth trends  in manufacturing sector, even negative in recent 
years, has reduced revenue potentials to be tapped through sales tax and excise duty. 
This provides a glaring unfavourable  contrast with the period immediately preceding  
the launching of reforms when manufacturing growth was around 8 percent per 
annum. 
 
Budgetary Impact of Foreign Exchange Policy Reforms 
Under the exchange rate system prior to 7th January 1982, Pak Rupee was 
linked with the US dollar and infact the fixed exchange rate system continued since 
1947 although the Rupee had been devalued on two occasions till 7th January, 1982. 
Since the new exchange rate policy brought about a switch over from fixed parity 
with US dollar to a managed floating system under which the Rupee was linked with 
a basket of currencies of country’s major trade partners. The Rupee had remained 
subjected to periodic depreciation/devaluation. During January 1982 to 1987 the 
Rupee was devalued by 43 percent and under the current exchange reforms the 
Rupee came under great pressure and there was persistent pressure by the donors for 
devaluation. There were also  a genuine ground because the domestic prices recorded 
higher increases over the preceding period and higher inflation, therefore, justified 
correction in the exchange rate through devaluation with a view to protect  
competitiveness of exports in international market. 
During the period, 1987-88 to 1997-98, the Rupee recorded against the US 
dollar a depreciation/devaluation of 59 percent.  The rupee: dollar parity changed 
from Rs 17.6/dollar to Rs 43.2/dollar. This directly impacted the Rupee debt 
servicing liability in the case of foreign debt. As demonstrated in an earlier table, 
repayment of foreign debt as percent of GDP has gone up from 2 percent of GDP in 
1987-89 to 4 percent of GDP in 1997-98 and is estimated at 4.1 percent of GDP in 
1998-99. The repayments/amortisation of foreign debt stood at Rs 13.5 billion in 
1987-88. The positive impact of devaluation expected to come through higher rupee 
value of imports leading to higher yield of advalorem import duties was neutralised 
by negative impact of falling imports and scaling down of tariffs. The exchange rate 
policy reforms pushed the expenditure to rise more in the process of reforms than in 
the earlier period. The Rupee valued  debt servicing of foreign loans has directly 
increased and thus built  pressure on government budget. 
 
Privatising and Divesting Policies’ Impact on Budget 
 The tradition of direct involvement of the public sector in economic activities 
started in the early history of the country when the government established Industrial 
Development Corporation of Pakistan to undertake industrial projects. In fact that 
was necessitated due to the fact that  the private sector was shy to undertake capital 
intensive industries because that did not have the experience and expertise in the 
field. Nevertheless these projects were ultimately to be sold to the private sector on 
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completion. However a radical change occurred in the national economic philosophy 
in the 70s, and an equity-oriented development strategy was pursued under which 
large scale nationalisation took place in the fields of major industries, banking, 
insurance, shipping and trade. As a result public corporate sector emerged in tandem 
with general government and that started maintaining its own parallel budget. There 
was a fiscal  linkage between the general government and the public corporate 
sector. The pricing policies were controlled by the government which kept prices 
below cost and consequently the public sector enterprises were meeting their deficit 
by borrowing funds from central government, banking sector and private sector but 
in certain cases the Federal Government gave subsidy on some operations 
undertaken under specific government directives. 
The public corporate sector as a whole has remained for a long time in net 
deficit and such persistent deficit has pushed it into a debt trap. This has thus 
created problems for monetary and fiscal policies. The fixed investment in the 
corporate sector was mostly owned by the government and its profitability soon 
turned into loss which had direct bearing on the public finances.  Under the 
reforms around the turn of the 80s the government has off loaded a big chunk of 
the public corporate sector and so far 105 units falling in  manufacturing,  banking, 
PTC vouchers, and power sectors have been divested against Rs 60.67 billion and 
an amount of Rs 57.23 billion plus mark up of Rs 1288.3 million has been 
received. Of this an amount Rs. 37.66 billion has been used by Government/ 
WAPDA during 1994-95 to 1997-98 in routine operations and about Rs 5 billion 
has been used for retirement of public debt. 
 
Administered Pricing Policy 
The prices of agricultural inputs, gas and public utilities were controlled by 
the Government and these were invariably kept below their actual cost. In most cases 
the public sector was directly involved in the production and distribution of these 
commodities and utilities, and the price-cost differential was met either by way of 
subsidies or through borrowings. Maintaining such differential persistently over a 
long period caused the debt liability of some public sector agencies like WAPDA 
and KESC to skyrocket. Under the price reforms the subsidies on agricultural inputs 
like fertiliser and pesticides has been almost eliminated and there has been some 
increase in the prices of agricultural non traded inputs like irrigation water, credit 
and electricity but even the revised prices did not cover total cost. Some progress has 
been made in implementing economic pricing but still  sale prices of  electricity and 
gas are much less than the cost   which also continued to increase due to rising 
wages, rents and interests. The subsidy bill on fertilisers has sharply declined from 
Rs 1.4 billion in 1990-91 to Rs. 47 million in 1995-96  and was then completely 
eliminated in subsequent years. In the recent years only in 1994-95 and 1995-96 a 
subsidy of Rs 1 billion per annum was given on agricultural loans. 
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These reforms have two  positive effects: one is a  clear move in the direction 
of reduction in the burden of subsidies on budget and the second is that economic 
pricing policy has been recognised as a cardinal principle of the national 
development  strategy for achieving fiscal discipline.  
 
Budgetary Implications of Social Safety Net 
    and Provision of Social Services 
In the process of reforms two important  developments took place.  First, it 
was recognised that in the transition phase of reforms  income disparities at personal 
as well as regional (rural viz. urban) level have widened and poverty incidence risen.  
This was to be mitigated by having adequate social safety-net. In recognition of the 
need for improving the quality and coverage of social services like education, health 
etc. for upgrading low ranked human development indicators, the government had to 
increase social spending. The government had to subsidise wheat distribution 
network. Its budgetary impact has earlier declined from Rs 5.9 billion in 1991-92 to 
Rs 2.9 billion but has subsequently increased to Rs 11.7 billion in 1997-98. To assist 
the poor financially the government has to run Bait-ul Mal which entailed an 
endowment of Rs 2 billion. In February 1997 Poverty Alleviation Fund has been 
established with a Government-contributed endowment of Rs 2 billion. Loans of 
SBFC and HBFC are also subsidised. Expenditure on education and health sectors 
has been increased in parallel to overall expenditure under budget but a gigantic SAP 
stipulates huge expenditure which has put a heavy impact on the budget. 
 
Direct Role of Fiscal Policy Reforms 
The focus of the fiscal policy reforms was on reduction in fiscal deficit by 
mobilising more revenues and curtailing public expenditure. The measures aimed at 
mobilising additional resources envisaged fundamental changes in the taxation 
system in the form of shifting emphasis from the taxes on foreign trade to 
generalised income and consumption taxes, broadening tax base, reducing tax rate, 
curtailing numbers of tax slabs, switching over from quantum to advalorem basis in 
the case of taxes on foreign trade, excise duty and sales tax. In the case of taxes on 
international trade sharp reduction has been made in the maximum tariff which has 
been brought down to 45 percent and their structure is simplified to only four 
cascadence tax rates. The coverage of excise duty and sales tax has also been 
increased and their structure has been reformed in terms of reduction in the number 
of tax slabs and switch over from quantum to advalorem basis. Direct taxes have also 
undergone similar reforms as the tax rates has been reduced and many services and 
agriculture have been brought into their tax net. 
Government has succeeded  in curtailing the level of public development 
expenditure in relation to GDP and in current expenditure some selected expenditure 
categories like transfer payments particularly subsidies have been reduced. 
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Nevertheless the propensity to reduce the current expenditure is limited as most of 
the items like interest payments and expenditure on essential services like law and 
order, general administration cannot be reduced beyond a certain level. Moreover 
with a time lag, the expenditure on projects and economic activities undertaken 
under development programmes are shifted, on their  completion, to the current 
expenditure and this is a continuous inflow into the current expenditure. 
Notwithstanding the inflexibility in the current expenditure, the reduction in public 
expenditure had become possible through reduction in the development expenditure. 
The reforms did not show satisfactory results in tax realisation and in fact the tax 
receipts pace has rather slackened. In the second half of  the 80s the tax revenues 
were on average slightly higher than 14 percent of GDP while this average has  
slightly slipped to little over 13 percent. The non tax revenues had shown a slight 
improvement in the early 90s as these were on average 4.3 percent of GDP but these 
declined to less than 3 percent of GDP in the last three years through 1997-98. The 
overall expenditure had touched a peak at 26.7 percent of GDP in  1997-98 but in 
subsequent years the level  started tapering off and it has declined to 21.8 percent of 
GDP in 1997-98.  Relatively some decline has been recorded in both current and 
development expenditures but as already mentioned the development expenditure 
became the main victim of this reduction [See Annex Table 5]. 
Many fiscal specific factors have stood in the way of efficient implementation 
of fiscal reforms. The provincial government and local bodies did not actively 
participate in resource mobilisation and have thus failed to meet the mandate of the 
National Finance Commission awards which reflect the plan for intergovernmental 
fiscal relations. The other principal factors include a continued exclusion of potential 
tax handles, large scale tax evasion, anomalies in tariff policies, heavy tilt towards 
indirect taxes (inspite the reforms), lags in tax policy, lack of documentation, vague 
language of tax amendment rules, thriving black economy, and lack of compatibility 
of the taxation system with the requirements of the ensuing regional blocks and 
international trade system.  Tightening the taxation system led to an under-invoicing 
of imports and over-invoicing of exports which is also feared to have caused capital 
flight [Commerce Minister’s Speech (1998)]. Frequent changes in the taxation policy 
and allowing a large number of tax exemptions on one or the pretext have  further 
compounded the fiscal problem. 
 
Secondary Effect of Reforms on Public Finances 
Reduction in the relative size of annual development programme in the budget 
made growth oriented projects, like those on water logging and anti salinity to starve.  
Dismantling protection tariff wall took a heavy toll on many industries. Withdrawal 
of subsidies on agricultural inputs  inflicted heavy below to agriculture. As a result 
the growth of real sectors suffered in the 90s.  Secondly under the reforms despite 
the government started tightening of the tax administration, tax evasion increased.  
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Frequent devaluations prompted  resort to foreign currency business which is  mostly  
out of tax net.  Similarly under-invoicing of imports became attractive.  As a result 
under ground or black economy has considerably expanded.  A recent research study 
has found that its annual growth has increased from 14 percent in the 80s to 26 
percent in the 90s [Iqbal et al. (1998)].  This trend combined with the depressed GDP 
growth has inhibited the pace of resource mobilisation under the existing taxation 
system. 
 
V.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The experience of almost 10 years of implementing SAAS reforms reveals 
that non-fiscal policies have mostly conflicted with fiscal policy in achieving fiscal 
discipline. At the cost of painful  tradeoffs  the fiscal policy deficit has come down  
from 7 percent of GDP in the 80s to 5.4 percent of GDP in 1997-98.  This  reduction 
in fiscal deficit  seems to have slowed pinched the growth tempo which in turn has 
reduced the revenue potentials [See Annex Table 5].  Whether the partial success of 
the reforms in limited areas outweighs the loss in the growth momentum is 
debatable.  Certainly reduction in fiscal deficit does not fully explain the fiscal 
discipline because that could be a necessary condition but not a sufficient condition 
for fiscal discipline.  Some what subdued deficit is accompanied with mounting debt 
liability, sluggish resource mobilisation and stubborn current expenditure place the 
public finances far away from the planned fiscal discipline. 
In fact the agenda of SAAS reforms was too big to be efficiently managed 
when the country did not have the expertise to steer it through the  vast restructuring 
of the economy.  The basic principle of economics that economic policies option 
conflict in their goals has been over looked.  The authorities have not been allowed 
sufficient time to appraise the reforms before these came under implementation 
because the donors pressed them to accept these as conditionalities  for loans which 
were badly needed to cover the  resource  gap.  Secondly the public, particularly 
business community, industry, and farmers have not  been taken into confidence in 
formulating SAAS reforms.  The press has always been hostile to them.  The reforms 
were not debated at national forums,  and thus no consensus was developed on the 
context of reforms.  In short, the reforms got poor receptivity within the country. 
The reforms lacked proper sequencing in their implementation.  Monetary 
policy reforms were front loaded with adverse fiscal fall out. Similarly by effecting 
reduction in tariffs on foreign trade before ensuring compensatory domestic taxes 
was ill timed. 
Absorption capacity was reduced by launching tight monetary and fiscal 
policy but that adversely affected domestic production.  Moreover these policies 
failed to give support to stabilise the Rupee  exchange rate.  Excepting temporary 
slow down in 1997-98 the domestic prices remained under persistent pressure, 
keeping inflation in double digit.  This distorted other policy objectives as well. 
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Defaulted  and non performing  bank loans have totalled about Rs 184 billion 
by 31st March, 1998 (reported by Finance Minister to the National Assembly on 
26th August, 1998—Business Recorder, 26th August, 1998) but their recovery is 
slow.  This is the greatest hurdle in reforming the banking system.  Lack of political 
will is considered a main cause of this malaise. 
There is urgent need for corrections both in the policy mix and their 
sequencing.  Consensus both at public and political level has  to be  developed on the 
reforms.  A strong team at technical level in all relevant fields has to be put together 
so that a meaningful dialogue could be made on conditionalities with the donors.  
Legal framework for implementation of the reforms should be speedily developed.  
Taxation system should contain minimum exemptions and concessions which often 
cause tax leakages.  Tax/tariff collection and administration needs to be strengthened 
and to be made immune to political influences.  In no case, fiscal policy should be 
anti-growth.  With a view to accelerate resource mobilisation  as  wall as to check 
fiscal leakage, fiscal devolution needs to be fostered.  Transparency should be 
encouraged in revenue collections and public spending to avoid corruption and to 
minimise tax evasion. 
The existing situation provides sound ground to conclude that the progress in 
reducing the deficit is not yet deeply entrenched in the economic structure and the 
fundamentals to support its continued downward trend in the long run are still 
fragile. Continued effort on the part of the authorities with support of the public is 
required to strengthen the process of reforms on lines indicated in the previous 
analysis. 
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